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In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend 
to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such 
conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use 
the framework of games with incomplete information. For a given game we first put a 
lower bound on ε so that there exists a Nash ε-equilibrium in pure strategies consistent 
with conformity. We also introduce a  new concept of conformity that allows players to 
conform and yet perform different actions. This is achieved by the endogenous 
assignment of roles to players and by allowing actions to be conditional on roles. We 




This paper is a revision of Cartwright and Wooders (2003a).The main results of this 
paper were presented at the 2002 General Equilibrium Conference held in Athens in 
May 2002 and at Northwestern University in August 2002. We thank the participants 
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   PERIOD 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
1  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
2                                                 
3  •  •     •     •  •  •  •     •  •     •  •  • 
4  •  •           •                               
5     •     •  •  •  •        •  •  •     •  •  • 
6  •  •  •  •  •  •        •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
7  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
8        •        •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
9  •  •  •  •     •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
10     •  •     •              •  •  •  •  •       








12     •     •  •  •  •     •  •                 • 
 
 
Figure 1a: The choices of players in each period. The symbol • indicates a player chose 
H and   indicates that a player chose D. 
 


























Figure 1b: The aggregate number of subjects playing D in each period. 
 
Figure 1: An experimental run of the one population, no labels Hawk-Dove game. The 
data corresponds to run 9 in session 6 of the Friedman (1996) experiments. The 
experiment lasted 16 periods and involved 12 subjects.   20
 
    PERIOD 
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
1     •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •                
3  •  •                 •  •  •                   
5     •        •  •           •        •          
7        •  •  •                 •  •  •  •       









11  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
  
2     •  •                          •             
4  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
6     •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
8  •     •  •     •  •  •  •  •  •     •  •  •  • 
















12        •              •     •  •        •     • 
  
Figure 2a: The choices of players in each period. The symbol • indicates a player chose 
H and   indicates that a player chose D. 
























Figure 2b: The aggregate number of subjects in each group playing D in each period. 
The solid line indicates the number in Group 2. 
 
Figure 2: An experimental run of the two population, no labels Hawk-Dove game. The 
data corresponds to run 5 in session 23 of the Friedman (1996) experiments. The 
experiment lasted 16 periods and involved 12 subjects.     	 
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